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ABSTRACT—Theories of moral judgment have long empha-
sized reasoning and conscious thought while downplaying
the role of intuitive and contextual inﬂuences. However,
recent research has demonstrated that incidental feelings of
disgust can inﬂuence moral judgments and make themmore
severe. This study involved two experiments demonstrating
that the reverse effect can occur when the notion of physical
purity is made salient, thus making moral judgments less
severe. After having the cognitive concept of cleanliness acti-
vated (Experiment 1) or after physically cleansing them-
selves after experiencing disgust (Experiment 2), partici-
pants found certain moral actions to be less wrong than did
participants who had not been exposed to a cleanliness ma-
nipulation. The ﬁndings support the idea that moral judg-
ment can be driven by intuitive processes, rather than delib-
erate reasoning. One of those intuitions appears to be physi-
cal purity, because it has a strong connection tomoral purity.
Many cultures equate physical cleanliness with moral and spir-
itual purity. For example, many religious practices require that
one ﬁrst engage in physical cleansing, such as washing parts of
one’s body. Haidt and colleagues (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2008)
have proposed that the notion of purity constitutes a basic moral
intuition that developed from the need to safeguard oneself from
potentially harmful substances. According to this approach,
disgust evolved as an emotion to protect the body from germs,
parasites, and spoilt food, but it was then extended to social and
moral domains (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). As a conse-
quence, people often report ﬁnding immoral acts disgusting.
Indeed, similar neural structures appear to be involved in the
experience of physical and moral disgust (Moll et al., 2005).
Recent studies have demonstrated that experimentally in-
duced feelings of disgust can attach themselves to moral judg-
ments, leading the person to conclude that a particular moral
action is quite wrong (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; see
also Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Physical disgust was induced by
exposure to a bad smell, working in a disgusting room, recalling a
physically disgusting experience, or a video induction. In each
case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of
moral judgments in comparison with those made in control con-
ditions, and this effect applied irrespective of whether the action to
be judged was itself physically disgusting or not. In contrast to
disgust, induced sadness did not inﬂuence moral judgments.
These studies showed that moral judgments can be based on in-
tuitive emotional feelings rather than on rational reasoning pro-
cesses (Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2006), even when the feeling of disgust
was irrelevant to the moral action under consideration.
On the ﬂip side of disgust, the association between physical and
moral purity in Western cultures was recently demonstrated by
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). After recalling a moral transgres-
sion from their own lives, participants weremore likely to think of
cleansing-related words, and they showed a desire to engage in
cleansing behavior. The two experiments reported in this article
investigated the reverse relationship: If cleansing behavior can
‘‘wash away one’s sins,’’ as Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) dem-
onstrated, then the feeling of cleanliness should reduce the per-
ceived seriousness of moral transgressions and also ‘‘wash away
other people’s sins.’’ Following research showing that concepts of
cleanliness can be primed in subtle ways (Holland, Hendriks, &
Aarts, 2005), the ﬁrst experiment activated concepts of cleanli-
ness and asked participants to rate how wrong certain moral
actions were. Because the sense of purity from the priming
should be misattributed to the moral judgments, it was expected
that priming with cleanliness words would reduce the severity
of moral judgments more so than would priming with neutral
control words.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Forty University of Plymouth undergraduate students (30 fe-
male, 10 male; mean age 5 20.00 years, SD 5 1.85 years)
participated as part of a course requirement.
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Procedure
Participants, in individual sessions, ﬁrst completed a scram-
bled-sentences task (adapted from Costin, 1969) involving 40
sets of four words each. By underlining any three words in a set, a
sentence could be formed. For the neutral condition, the task
contained 40 sets of scrambled neutral words. For the cleanli-
ness condition, half of the sets contained words related to the
theme of cleanliness and purity (e.g., pure, washed, clean, im-
maculate, pristine), and the other sets contained only neutral
words.
Immediately after the priming task, participants rated six
moral dilemmas (as used by Schnall et al., 2008): ‘‘Dog’’ (eating
one’s dead dog), ‘‘Trolley’’ (switching the tracks of a trolley to kill
one workman instead of ﬁve), ‘‘Wallet’’ (keeping money inside a
found wallet), ‘‘Plane Crash’’ (killing a terminally ill plane crash
survivor to avoid starvation), ‘‘Re´sume´’’ (putting false informa-
tion on a re´sume´), and ‘‘Kitten’’ (using a kitten for sexual
arousal). Participants rated how wrong each action was from 0
(perfectly OK) to 9 (extremely wrong). Participants subsequently
indicated their feelings at the moment for the items relaxed,
angry, happy, sad, afraid, depressed, disgusted, upset, and con-
fused, using a 10.5-cm visual analog scale labeled ‘‘Don’t feel at
all’’ at one end and ‘‘Feel very strongly’’ at the other. All scales
were scored by measuring in half centimeters from the ‘‘Don’t
feel at all’’ end, yielding raw scores ranging from 0 to 21.
Results and Discussion
Emotion Ratings
To test whether the priming had an effect on the emotion ratings
as assessed at the end of the experiment, ratings were analyzed
by individual one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with
priming (cleanliness vs. neutral) as a factor. No group differ-
ences were found on any of the emotion ratings (all preps< .86).
Thus, it appears that the cleanliness priming did not induce any
speciﬁc mood.
Moral Judgments
The mean composite of all six moral vignettes was computed. To
test whether priming the participants with cleanliness reduced
the severity of moral judgments, we conducted a one-way
ANOVA on the composites with priming (cleanliness vs. neutral)
as a factor. As predicted, participants gave lower ratings after
the cleanliness priming (M 5 4.98, SD 5 1.26) than they did
after the neutral priming (M5 5.81, SD5 1.47), F(1, 38)5 3.63,
prep 5.90, Zp
2 ¼ :09. When analyzed individually, all six moral
vignettes showed the same pattern (see Table 1), with a signiﬁcant
difference between conditions for the ‘‘Kitten’’ vignette, F(1, 38)5
5.71, prep5 .95, Zp
2 ¼ :13.
The ﬁrst experiment demonstrated that participants found
moral transgressions to be less bad after concepts of cleanliness
were cognitively activated. This ﬁnding indicates the connec-
tion between cognitive and moral purity and shows that intuitive
concepts can have an inﬂuence on moral judgments indepen-
dently of deliberate reasoning processes (Haidt, 2001).
EXPERIMENT 2
The ﬁrst experiment showed that surreptitiously activated cog-
nitive concepts related to purity can inﬂuence moral decisions.
However, in addition to cognitive components, a central com-
ponent of purity is the physical behavior of cleansing one’s body
from experienced contaminants (Rozin et al., 2000). Indeed,
disgust, the feeling indicating the absence of physical purity,
might be an especially embodied emotion because of its strong
connection to nausea and the physical process of expelling
contaminants (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Schnall
et al., 2008). Thus, if there is a strong connection between
physical cleansing and moral purity, then cleansing behavior
might eliminate the effect of an already-present feeling of dis-
gust on moral judgments. As noted earlier, several studies
demonstrated that feelings of disgust can make moral judgments
more severe (Schnall et al., 2008;Wheatley &Haidt, 2005). The
aim of the second study was to test whether this effect could be
reduced when participants were given an opportunity to physi-
cally cleanse themselves after experiencing disgust. All par-
ticipants watched a physically disgusting scene from a ﬁlm, and
half of the participants were asked to wash their hands with soap
and water before completing the moral vignettes. We predicted
that those participants who engaged in hand washing would
make less severe judgments for the moral dilemmas than would
the participants who did not wash their hands after the dis-
gusting ﬁlm clip.
Method
Participants
Forty-four University of Plymouth undergraduate students (32
female, 12 male; mean age 5 22.18 years, SD 5 4.89 years)
TABLE 1
Mean Ratings for Moral Vignettes in Experiment 1
Condition Dog Trolley Wallet Plane Crash Re´sume´ Kitten
Cleanliness priming (n 5 20) 5.70 (2.39) 1.85 (1.50) 4.95 (2.35) 6.05 (2.39) 4.65 (2.28) 6.70 (2.49)
Neutral priming (n 5 20) 6.55 (2.52) 2.75 (2.38) 5.45 (2.86) 6.45 (2.56) 5.40 (2.26) 8.25 (1.48)
Note. Response scales ranged from 0 (perfectly OK) to 9 (extremely wrong). Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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participated as part of a course requirement. One participant’s
data were excluded from analysis because she declined to wash
her hands when asked to do so.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. Two laboratory rooms were
used: We showed the ﬁlm clip in the ﬁrst room and administered
themoral dilemmas in the second. Participants ﬁrst watched a 3-
min clip from the ﬁlm Trainspotting that was previously shown to
elicit strong disgust (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004;
Schnall et al., 2008). Participants were then taken to a different
room, ostensibly because the next participant would soon be
arriving to watch the ﬁlm. Participants in the hand-washing
condition were additionally told that the second room was a staff
room and that they would be required to wash their hands when
going into it, because the room needed to be kept as clean and
tidy as possible. The staff room was equipped with a sink, an-
tibacterial soap in a pump dispenser, and paper towels. To make
the cover story about the room plausible, the table was covered
with a tablecloth, and a vase with artiﬁcial ﬂowers was placed on
it to create the sense of its being a tidy staff room. Participants
sat down at the table and completed the same six vignettes used
in Experiment 1.1 To ensure that the ﬁlm induced comparable
levels of disgust in both conditions, participants were then asked
to think back of how they had felt immediately after watching the
ﬁlm and indicate their feelings at the time using the same
emotion rating scales as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Emotion Ratings
To test whether participants in both conditions experienced
more disgust than any other emotion following the ﬁlm clip, a
repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out with all nine emo-
tion ratings. No overall difference was found for condition, F(1,
41)5 0.24, prep5 .63, and there was no interaction of condition
and emotions, F(8, 328)5 0.82, prep5 .65. Looking speciﬁcally
at disgust, simple contrasts showed that the disgust ratings were
signiﬁcantly higher than each of the other mood ratings (all preps<
.99). Means indicated that participants felt disgust more strongly
(M5 14.26, SD5 6.09) than any other emotion, particularly other
negative emotions such as anger (M 5 2.84, SD 5 3.39) and
sadness (M 5 5.72, SD 5 5.06). Participants in both conditions
felt equally disgusted immediately after watching the ﬁlm, as in-
dicated by a nonsigniﬁcant effect between condition for the rating
of disgust, F(1, 41)5 1.04, prep 5 .76. Thus, all participants re-
ported feeling strong disgust before the hand-washing manipula-
tion.
Moral Judgments
We computed the mean composite of all six moral vignettes and
predicted that participants who washed their hands following
the disgusting ﬁlm clip would make less severe judgments than
would participants who did not wash their hands. Indeed, a one-
way ANOVAwith condition (hand washing vs. no hand washing)
as a factor found a signiﬁcant difference between the conditions
on the composite rating, F(1, 41)5 7.81, prep5 .97, Zp
2 ¼ :16.
Further analyses showed that participants in the hand-washing
condition made less severe judgments for each moral dilemma
than did participants in the no-hand-washing condition, with
statistically signiﬁcant differences between conditions for ‘‘Trol-
ley,’’F(1, 41)5 6.50, prep5 .96,Zp
2 ¼ :14, and ‘‘Wallet,’’F(1, 41)
56.65, prep5 .96,Zp
2 ¼ :14, and amarginal effect for ‘‘Re´sume´,’’
F(1, 41)5 3.83, prep5 .91, Zp
2 ¼ :09 (see Table 2 for means).
The ﬁndings fromExperiment 2 indicate that participants who
washed their hands after watching a disgusting ﬁlm clip made
less severe moral judgments than did participants who did not
wash their hands. Emotion ratings suggested that participants in
both conditions experienced strong disgust immediately after
watching the ﬁlm clip, which is consistent with earlier research
using the same clip (Lerner et al., 2004; Schnall et al., 2008).
Because of the danger of making the cleansing manipulation
salient, we did not obtain additional disgust ratings after the
hand-washing procedure. However, given our conceptual
framework and the magnitude of the effect across conditions, we
presume that the hand washing reduced feelings of disgust,
which in turn reduced the severity of the moral judgments.
The study protocol involved the experimenter verbally refer-
ring to the room as needing to be ‘‘clean’’ and ‘‘tidy.’’ Thus, it is
conceivable that these instructions, rather than the hand
washing alone, might have primed the cognitive construct of
cleanliness. Indeed, perhaps the combination of the cognitive
priming and the cleansing behavior ampliﬁed the effect. The
magnitude of the effect was greater in Experiment 2 (Zp
2 ¼ :16)
TABLE 2
Mean Ratings for Moral Vignettes in Experiment 2
Condition Dog Trolley Wallet Plane Crash Re´sume´ Kitten
Hand washing (n 5 21) 5.33 (1.88) 2.81 (1.08) 4.62 (1.53) 5.38 (1.80) 4.24 (1.67) 6.00 (1.18)
No hand washing (n 5 22) 5.73 (0.98) 3.64 (1.05) 5.73 (1.28) 6.05 (1.21) 5.09 (1.15) 6.36 (1.00)
Note. Response scales ranged from 1 (nothing wrong at all) to 7 (extremely wrong). Standard deviations are given in
parentheses.
1In contrast to Experiment 1, the scale for Experiment 2 ranged from 1
(nothing wrong at all) to 7 (extremely wrong).
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than it was in Experiment 1 (Zp
2 ¼ :09), which is consistent
with that possibility. Thus, although it is not clear whether the
hand washing itself was the only reason for the reduction in
moral condemnation, it appears to have contributed over and
above the priming of cleanliness concepts.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two experiments provided evidence that activating intuitions
about cleanliness can reduce the severity of moral judgments.
Participants who had cognitive concepts of cleanliness activated
(Experiment 1) or who had physically cleansed themselves after
experiencing disgust (Experiment 2) made less severe moral
judgments relative to participants who were not exposed to
cleanliness manipulations. In both experiments, the effect of the
rather subtle manipulations was substantial, with medium to
large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988).
Our ﬁndings support the notion that purity can serve as a basic
intuition when judging the moral quality of an action: People
appear to have intuitions about moral transgressions that go
beyond principles of harm or fairness. Thus, our ﬁndings support
Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model that proposes that peo-
ple use intuitions when making judgments about right and
wrong, even when these intuitions are incidental and irrelevant
to the object or situation being judged. Whereas Zhong and
Liljenquist’s (2006) studies indicated that activating cleansing-
related concepts alleviated concerns about one’s own morality,
the cleanliness manipulations in the two studies reported in this
article inﬂuenced how morally wrong participants considered
hypothetical actions that were not immediately pertinent to
themselves.
Although discussion of Haidt’s (2001) model has predomi-
nantly focused on emotional processes (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003),
strictly speaking, it does not pit emotional against rational
processes; rather, it emphasizes the quick and automatic nature
of both affective and cognitive processes that take place largely
outside of conscious awareness. In fact, we agree with Monin,
Pizarro, and Beer’s (2007) observation that the polarizing debate
of the roles of reason and/or emotion in making moral judgments
might artiﬁcially limit the study of moral psychology. Intuitive
processes might not always need to involve emotional processes
(cf. Hauser, 2006). Indeed, in our two studies, we found that
intuitive processes and contextual factors unrelated to speciﬁc
emotions inﬂuenced moral judgments. Intuitions were provided
by activating concepts relating to purity (Experiment 1) and by
having participants engage in cleansing behaviors that rees-
tablished physical purity after experiencing physical disgust
(Experiment 2).
In conclusion, the current studies provide evidence that, in
the context of morality, purity is not just a metaphor. Presumably
because human beings aim to distinguish themselves from other
animals, they attempt to place themselves close to higher spir-
itual beings by being physically andmorally pure (Haidt, Koller,
&Dias, 1993; Rozin et al., 2000). Because of its potential to lead
people to regard moral actions as pure and good, cleanliness
might indeed feel as if it were next to godliness.
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